This paper deals with two specific issues: the explanation of moral conduct and the structure of moral character. The purpose of the paper is to describe a new psychological perspective on moral conduct, and to discuss some empirical findings which follow from this perspective. Morality is regarded here as a natural phenomenon which considers understanding of moral behavior to be dependent on knowledge of man's biological and psychological nature. The irrplied assumption is that an evaluative tendency is an integral part of social conduct and, moreover, that moral conduct is social conduct. Definitions are provided for irorality, moral behavior, and moral character. Five important aspects of character development that are pertinent to the explanation of moral behavior are: moral kncwledge, socialization, empathy, the ethics of conscience vs. the ethics ot responsibility, and autonomy. Each of these dimensions is defined in terms of a specific assessment device, and the relationships among the scales are examined. ( ii ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The Center for Social Organization of Schools has two primary objectives: to develop a scientific knowledge of how schools affect their students, and to use this knowledge to develop better school practices and organization.
The Center works through five programs to achieve its objectives.
The Academic Games program has developed simulation games for use in the classroom. It is evaluating the effects of games on student learning and studying how games can improve interpersonal relations in the iii :1
Introduction
The subject of moral conduct contains some of the most intriguing problems and paradoxes in the social sciences. These problems (e.g., why a man would follow the path of greatest resistance; why saints seem obsessed with a sense of sin) have preoccupied social thinkers since Plato, including, more recently, Durkheim, Weber, Freud, Piaget,
Will iam James, and George Herbert Mead. In the early stages of American psychology there was great interest in the "psychology of moral conduct;" however, the Character Education Inquiry (Hartshorne and May, 1930) seemed to demonstrate that most such behavior is situation specific, and the subject fell into subsequent neglect. In a series of papers beginning in 1958, Kohlberg revived interest in moral psychology, and his research on moral judgment exemplified the relevance, complexity, and psychological richness traditionally associated with the topic. The purpose of this paper is to describe a new psychological perspective on moral conduct, and to discuss some empirical findings which follow from this perspective. We begin with a few preliminary remarks about morality, moral behavior, and moral character, observations which serve to define the framework of the discussion.
However, the bulk of the paper deals with two specific issues: the explanation of moral conduct and the structure of moral
character.
An earlier paper (Hogan and Henley, 1970a) suggested that, as an alternative to explaining social behavior in terms of needs, drives, traits, or mechanisms of coping and defense, it might be useful to consider man as a rule-producing and rule-following animal. The argument derives from a more comprehensive theory of social behavior based on psychological. (as opposed to sociological) role theory, existentialism, and an image of man as a game-playing animal (cf. Coffman, 1959; Huizinga, 1955; Peters, 1958; Sartre, 1953; and Wright, 1971) .
While the details of the argument are not important here, three of its assumptions are pertinent. The first two assumptions are substantive; the third follows as their methodological consequence.
It is assumed first that all purposive social behavior occurs within matrices of overlapping human rule systems (e.g., grammars, legal codes, rules of courtesy) which have varying degrees of specificity. (It follows, somewhat tautologically, that behavior not guided by rules is non-purposive or "random.") Second, associated with every human rule system is an ethic, variously called sportsmanship, fairness, justice, equity, or the spirit of the game. This ethic is usually known and acknowledged by seasoned participants of a given rule system; moreover, it is a spontaneous natural emergent, a product of role-taking experience and cognitive development. The function of this ethic is to provide a perspective from which the equity of conventional rules may be judged.
Third, the broad outlines and general patterns of social behavior can be explained in terms of formal properties of various applicable ruie systems. Individual differences, however, must be accounted for in terms of the differing fashion in which persons think about and use rules.
That is, much of the variance in a situation will be attributable to structural variables (the rules which apply), while the "error"
variance will be a function of how people use the rules.
Marty contemporary psychologists consider moral action to be in some way distinct from ordinary social conduct. Thus Kohlberg (1958) remarks that in the moral domain persons feel the rules are constraining in and of recognize similarly themse Ives, the content whereas in the social (non-moral) area persons of convention as artificial.
observes, "Both the formulated and the experience Wright (1971) conceptual framework in which they are which goes with as distinctively different from, for example, grammar, or etiquette" (p. 14) . In contrast, them mark out moral rules the rules of tennis, the present paper is grounded in the Aristotelian tradition in ethics, a tradition which regards morality as a natural phenomenon, a product of man's biological evolution, and which considers understanding of moral behavior to be dependent on knowledge of man's biological and psychological nature (cf. Hamilton, 19 71; Lorenz, 1966; Waddington, 1967) . The implied assumption is that an evaluative tendency is an integral part of social conduct, and that morality has a social job to do; i.e., the function of morality is to regulate and moderate human affairs. McDougall (1908) epitomized this attitude: "Moral conduct is essentially social conduct, and there could be no serious objection to the use of the two expressions as synonymous; but it is more in conformity with common usage to restrict the term 'moral' to the higher forms of social conduct which man alone is capable" (p. 150).
These remarks serve as a background for the definitions of morality, moral behavior, and moral character which follow.
Morality. According to H. L. A. Hart (1962) , the basis of any morality is a system of rules of conduct which defines a network of 3 reciprocal rights and obligations and which prohibits at least gross acts of malevolence. Moralities, then, are systems of rules that are external to people, designed to guide social or interpersonal behavior, and which may to some degree be codified and spelled out. This definition does not require a morality to be entirely compatible with or unequivocally further the welfare of individuals subject to it, nor does it require that a particular morality be completely equitable when viewed from a perspective outside the system in which it applies. In fact, the requirements of justice or fair play in a given situation may occasionally run contrary to the prevailing moral code.
Moral behavior. Moral behavior consists of actions carried out with regard to the rules that apply in a given social context (see also, Wright, 1971, p. 15 The third dimension involves role-taking and the recognition of the rights of others; it is the disposition to adopt the "moral point of view." The fourth dimension concerns the degree to which a person considers rules to be useful for regulating human affairs.
The final dimension is defined by the degree of autonomy, a person displays in his moral conduct.
As an aid to understanding the interrelationships among these five concepts, consider the following example as a paradigm case. A college student of modest talent, while taking a difficult examination whose outcome he believes will affect his future career, observes the answer sheet of an unusually gifted student lying in plain view in front of him. However, he deliberately ignores the answer sheet, thereby losing 'an opportunity to improve his score. How can we explain his action?
Moral Knowledge
The first answer to our paradigm question is that the student knows a rule that prohibits copying answers from another person's test. This is important because people can follow only the rules that they know. (1) Specific, primarily negative, injunctions related to particular acts, such as "Don't get dirty; "Don't hurt the cat."
(2) Moral principles--concepts, corresponding to Piaget's notion of a schema, that permit flexibility in social conduct and enable the child to choose between conflicting injunctions. An example of this type rule is the concept of reciprocity (cf. Gouldner, 1960) . Moral knowledge is importaht because it provides the potential for self-control. That is, by learning a set of specific injunctions, moral principles, and comparison rules, one acquires the cognitive foundation for self-criticism, which in turn is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the later development of self-control. Assume, for example, that a tennis player is losing a match and, after applying a series of comparison rules to the various rules of tennis form, decides he isn't volleying deeply enough. Whether or not he alters his subsequent strokes in accordance with this self-critical perception depends largely on his interest in winning. Thus, knowledge of the appropriate rules and the capacity for self-criticism afford the possibility but not the assurance 7 of self-control (for an alternative perspective on the development of self-control, see Aronfreed, 1964) .
Although considerable effort has been spent studying the behavioral implications of moral knowledge (cf. Pittel and Mendelsohn, 1967) , this research has produced essentially negligible results. For example, the Hartshorne and May studies (1930) included several measures of moral knowledge, none of which predicted resistance to temptation in check situations. Nor was there a significant relationship between a child's evaluation of the wrongness of cheating during interviews and his behavior in experimental situations. Similarly, Gordon, et al. (1963) found no differences in the degree to which six groups of teenage boys (black and white; delinquent, non-delinquent, lower class, middle class) positively endorsed middle class norms. Moreover, as Maller (1944) observed, tests of moral knowledge correlate about as highly with IQ tests as IQ tests correlate with themselves. Moral knowledge seems to be primarily related to intelligence, background, and desire to make a good impression (cf. Kohlberg, 1964 ). Because we are normally justified in assuming that people know the rules, it seems naive to assume a strong connection between knowledge of the rules and willingness to abide by them. As Malinowski pointed out in Crime and Custom in Savage Society, there are deviants in every society; however, no one ever doubts what is held to be right and wrong. The problem lies in learning to live with the "right" of one's society.
Socialization
The second answer to the paradigm question is that our student may
consider the rule about test cheating to be personally binding; i.e., he 8 may be socialized with regard to the rules of test-taking. The term socialization has few distinctive conceptual properties remaining after years of uncritical use (cf. Clausen, 1967) . For the purposes of this paper, however, a person may be considered socialized to the degree that he regards the rules, values, and prohibitions of his society as personally mandatory. Conversely, to the extent that one feels estranged from the rules and procedures of his social group, he will tend to be unsocialized. Hart's (1962) distinction between an internal and an external attitude toward social rules reflects the phenomonology of socialization:
When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords an opportunity for many closely related yet different kinds of assertions; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides tu conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and the 'internal points of view.' (p. 86).
Hence a society with law contains those who look upon its rules from the internal point of view as accepted standards of behavior, and not merely as reliable predictions of what will befall them, at the hands of officials, if they disobey.
But it also comprises those upon whom, either because they are malefactors or mere helpless victims of the system, these legal standards have to be imposed by force or threat of force; they are concerned with the rules merely as a source of possible punishment (p. 197).
Considerable research has been directed toward discovering the developmental antecedents of socialization. The resulting literature is too extensive to review here. The available evidence, however, strongly suggests that warm, nurturant, and consistently restrictive or "authoritative" parents produce the most socialized children (cf. Bandura and Walters, 1958; Baumrind, 1971; Becker, 1964; Bronfenbrenner, 9 1970). It is conventional to assume some sort of natural antagonism , between the individual and society. Freud, for example, believed that 'a child becomes able to live in society only after his natural, but implacably anarchic, instinctual tendencies are permanently repressed.
One might equally hypothesize, however, that children are not anarchical but social by nature, that they enter the world preprogramed to be obedient, and that warmth and nurturance are essential in eliciting these tendencies.
For example, in a sample of 11 month old infants, Stayton, Hogan, and Ainsworth (1972) found the only parent-child variable that predicted obedience to commands was maternal warmth (r = .74). Baumrind's (1971) It is with regard to the socialization dimension that a major measurement breakthrough in the study of moral conduct first occurred.
The Socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1957; Gough and Peterson, 1952) , an empirically-keyed measure developed by comparing the responses of a large number of delinquents and non-delinquents, was specifically developed to assess the degree to which a person has internalized the rules, values, and conventions of his society. This scale may be the most carefully developed and best validated measure in the history of personality assessment. As an example of its remarkable properties, the measure was given in eight 10 different languages in ten countries to totals of 21,772 non-delinquents and 5,052 delinquents. In every comparison the test differentiated significantly between delinquents and non-delinquents; furthermore, in no instance was the mean of a delinquent sample in one country greater than the mean of a non-delinquent sample in any other country (cf. Gough, 1965) . The scale seems to work equally well at various levels of socialization as well. At the upper level, Holland (1959) found, for example, that SocirP.zation scores significantly predicted academic achievement among National Merit Scholars. At the lower end, Vincent (1961) found that the scale differentiated between female welfare recipients with one illegitimate child and those with two or more.
Thus, Gough's Socialization scale seems to be a highly valid empirical index of the degree to which one has internalized culturally defined rules.
Willingneus to follow rules is an tmportant determinant of moral behavior and a major component of character development. Nonetheless, two considerations suggest that further information is necessary in order to assess adequately a person's character structure.
First, other things being equal, well-socialized persons are also likely to be stuffy, rule-bound, pedantic, prigs. Second, many people who consistently comply with social norms did not enjoy the sort of childhood experiences that produce a high degree of socialization. As Megargee, et al. (1971) a perspective which tends to promote the common good. This viewpoint is a natural attitude which may be taught to children: "When we teach children the moral point of view, we try to explain it to them by getting them to put themselves in another person's place: How would you like to have that done to you!" (Baier, 1965, p. 107 for empathic sensitivity, a capacity which is elicited by social experience and which produces differences in rule-taking ability. For these role-theorists, group participation and an increased sensitivity to the demands of others results in self-consciousness which, in turn, causes the child to observe the rules of his society. The implication of all this for the explanation of social compliance is that the test-taking student in our paradigm case may refuse to cheat because doing so will have bad consequences for student society in general; cheating might be seen as "unfair," as contrary to the spirit of the academic game.
Hogan ( If socialization and empathy are independent aspects of moral development, then individual differences along these two dimensions should be associated with differences in character structure and moral conduct (see Table 1 ). Specifically, other things being equal, persons scoring low on both scales will tend to be delinquent. Those receiving low scores for empathy but high scores for socialization will tend to be rigid rule followers--moral realists in Piaget's (1964) terms. 
High
Persons with law scores foi socialization but high scores for empathy will tend to be cavalier about the conventional rules of society; they will be "emancipated," mildly sociopathic members of normal society--i.e., persons who doublc-park in parking lots, don't return borrowed books, and fudge on their income tax--Piaget refers to them as "chic types." Persons with high scores for socialization and empathy will tend to be morally mature--their compliance with social rules will be effortless but tempered by a sympathy for the moral frailties of others.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, then using the two variables together should permit more accurate predictions than using either by itself.
The mean scores for socialization and empathy for a sample of 100 inmates for a New York State reformatory were 26.2 and 29.1.
Comparable values for a group of 100 Air Force officers were 36.4 and 37.7.
By considering all persons scoring below 36.5 on socialization and 39.0 on empathy as delinquent, 95 percent of the delinquents were accurately classified, while 27 percent of the non-delinquents were misclassified. In a sample of 594 male undergraduates, Kurtines and Hogan (1972) identified 130 students whose socialization scores were less than or equal to the mean socialization score of 119 incarcerated delinquents (X = 26.88). As expected, the unsocialized students were relatively empathic compared to the delinquents (rois = .44).
In a study of the personological correlates of undergraduate marijuana use , students were placed in three groups: Users, Non-users, and Principled Non-users (e.g., students who said they hadn't smoked marijuana and never would). Relative to men in general, Users received low scores for Socialization and high scores for Empathy, while the pattern was precisely reversed for the Principled Non-users. Thus there is some evidence for the predictions outlined in Table 1 . (a) receiving empathic treatment at some time in one's life; and (b) enduring sufficient injustice, ridicule, betrayal, or persecution that the experience makes a lasting impression. The fourth factor that may contribute to an empathic disposition is a relative absence of repression or denial--an openness to inner experience, a willingness to attend to intuitive promptings and non-verbal cues.
In spite of the obvious importance of an empathic disposition in the formation of moral character, it is neither the only nor the most important factor in the process. There are two reasons for this. First, interviews with subjects who receive very high scores on the empathy scale suggest that these persons often suffer from an excess of roletaking--they are too concerned with the expectations of others, they excessively inhibit hostility and aggression, and they suffer from identity diffusion. Unleavened role-taking can produce an equivocatOtg jelly-fish as well as a compassionate person with a broad moral perspective. Furthermore, many persons whose behavior accords with social norms and conventions have experienced none of the developmental circumstances necessary to elicit an empathic disposition. To return to our paradigm case, how might we account for the student's reluctance to cheat if we discover that he is both unsocialized and non-empathic?
The Ethics of Conscience and the Ethics of Responsibility
There is a branch of moral philosophy which analyzes and evaluates arguments used to justify social and legal institutions. It considers questions of the following type: "To what kinds of considerations is appeal properly made when the authority of the political and legal order and our obligations to comply with its dictates are called into question?" (Olafson, 1961 Those who take the second viewpoint deny the existence of "higher" laws.
Instead, they justify their arguments in terms of the instrumental value of the manifest law as a means for promoting the general welfare of society. Laws and political institutions are merely instruments for the realization of the common good; just laws are those which tend on the whole to maximize happiness.
With certain exceptions, the first position has traditionally had the greater influence:
There can be little doubt that the system of justification which has exerted the widest intellectual influence and most decisively shaped the further development of social philosophy is the theory of natural [i.e., higher] law. It may even be said that with the idea of a natural law the whole enterprise of calling existing institutions to a moral accounting gets underway (Olafson, 1961, p. 8) . All civil laws should be judged against a higher moral law.
2.
Right and wrong can be meaningfully defined only by the law.
3.
An unjust law should not be obeyed.
4.
Without law the life of man would be nasty, brutish, and shoit. These items are answered by checking one of five response options ranging from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The parallel form reliability of the test in a sample of 98 college men was .88. The measure is uncorrelated with intelligence, and in two separate samples it discriminated very strongly between persons whose vocational choice reflected a belief in law and established procedures (i.e., policemen, ROTC seniors) and persons who believed in civil disobedience as a means for promoting social change (cf. Hogan, 1970) .
In contrast with Kohlberg (1963) and Piaget (1964) , the author assumes that moral conduct is fundamentally "irrational," that differences in even such obviously cognitive phenomena as moral judgments derive from more basic personological structures. If so, then there should be clearcut personality correlates of the disposition to adopt the ethics of 19 conscience or responsibility.
Correlations with the CPI, the MyersBriggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962) and several other personality measures suggest that persons who adopt the ethics of personal conscience possess an interesting set of positive and negative characteristics. They are independent, innovative, and form-c7eating; however, they also tend to be impulsive, opportunistic, and irresponsible. Consider once again our hypothetical, non-cheating student who we have discovered is neither well-socialized nor empathic. If he advocates the ethics of responsibility, he may then comply with rules because they make his world more orderly and predictable.
That is, a belief in the instrumental value of rules may produce social campliance despite deficient socialization and a lack of concern for the welfare of society.
We might also hypothesize that persons who are non-empathic, unsocialized, and endorse the ethics of conscience will very likely be delinquent.
Evidence for these hypotheses, however, is scanty. The author has obtained Survey of Ethical Attitude scores for a small number of nondelinquents who are also low on both socialization and empathy. Although these persons tended to endorse the ethics of responsibility, their numbers are too slight to warrant serious attention.
The next question concerns the developmental antecedents of the ethics of conscience and responsibility. A study by Hogan and Dickstein (1972a) provides some insight into this problem. Interviews with high and low scorers on the Survey of Ethical Attitudes suggested that both groups were highly sensitive to injustice, but differed markedly with regard to their perceptions of the sources of injustice in society.
The ethics of conscience seemed related to the belief that people are naturally benevolent and that social injustice is produced by dehumanizing and oppressive institutions; the ethics of responsibility seemed to rest on the notion that people are naturally malevolent and that institutions restrain the implacably antisocial impulses of men.
Scores for the tendency to blame people or institutions were assigned on the basis of a projective test (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972b) . The average correlation between these scores and the Survey of Ethical Attitudes across three groups (total N = 92) was .58 (.77 when corrected for attenuation), suggesting that the ethics of conscience and responsibility are indeed related to a person's perceived locus of injustice.
Thus home environments which encourage a belief in natural human goodness and a suspicion of institutions will tend to promote the ethics of conscience. Conversely, parents who foster skepticism concerning the motives of others will encourage a belief in the instrumental value of law and,.'consequently, the ethics of responsibility (see also MacDonald, Autonomy is a troublesome concept. An autonomous person who is also unsocialized, non-empathic, and disregards the pragmatic value of rules as well, is likely to be an autocratic, anti-conforming villain, a great rogue and scoundrel. Obviously this dimension, like all the others, can never be considered in isolation.
As a quantitative index of autonomy, the author uses a measure of independence of judgment developed by Barron (1953) . Although social psychologists have spent a great deal of time studying suggestibility and conformity, not much is known about autonomy.
In an unpublished study, Kurtines and Hogan gave the CM to 30 fraternity members who were undergraduates at The Johns Hopkins University. Eleven of these persons rated all the others for autonomy using a seven-point scale. Each person was assigned an autonomy score based on the average of the 11 ratings he received; the average interrater correlation was . In The Moral Judgment of the Child, Piaget (1964) suggested that children's morality is initially "heteronomous," authoritarian, and conditioned upon a unilateral respect for adult authority. If left alone by adu)ts, the child will acquire through the natural processes of cognitive development and peer interaction an "autonomous" and democratic morality based on mutual respect among peers. On this point Piaget seems surely to have been wrong. Comparing childrearing practices in the Societ Union and the United States, Bronfenbrenner (1970) , observes for example, that exclusive peer interaction in American children has produced effects precisely the opposite of those Piaget predicted: while American children, relative to Russian children, became emancipated from adult authority earlier, they remain thereafter excessively dependent on peer approval (see also Boehm, 1957) .
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In a carefully documented monograph, Baumrind (1971) suggests some important developmental precursors of autonomy. First, early development of cognitive and linguistic skills and stimulation of interest in school achievement seem to enhance a child's competence, and therefore, the self-esteem necessary for autonomous behavior.
Second, parents who are undemanding, passively accepting, and over-protective inhibit the development of autonomy in their children. Third, parents who are themse Ives individualistic , independent , and demanding provide their children with the strongest models for autonomous conduct. Fourth, warm, controlling parents produce immature and "avoidant" children.
Finally, parents who clearly label certain actions as praise-worthy or blame-worthy, explain their rules, and encourage verbal give and take, also promote the child's ability to "order" and control his own behavior.
We can now review the complete model for the explanation of moral conduct. Returning once again to the modestly talented student who didn't cheat on an important test, at least five considerations bear on his actions: he knew a rule which prohibited cheating; he had internalized the rule about cheating; he thought cheating would be unfair to other students; he believed in the instrumental value of rules per se; and, finally, he wasn't the sort of person who cheats on tests (as Nietzsche remarked concerning why the Ubermensch would keep his word, "That's the way men treat one another when they are free").
Discussion
We have described five important aspects of character development which, we suggested, are related to five considerations required for the 25 at explanation of moral behavior.
Each dimension is defined in terms of a specific assessment device. While the dimensions are conceptually independent, the relationships among the scales used to define them can be determined empirically. Krech's (Krech, et al. , 1962, p. 526) report of a dependable correlation between IQ and non-yielding in his experiments. The other correlations summarize data from the author's files. No claims are made for the generality of these coefficients, and other investigators will want to determine the interrelationships for themselves.
These dimensions also work moderately well together. Hogan and Dickstein (1972b) gave three fraternities (N = 92) a 15-item sentence completion test on which Ss were asked to respond quickly and briefly to such statements as:
1.
I think it is unnecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners on death row for so long, and to make the execution such an elaborate ritual.
2.
The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the foundations of our society.
Responses to these items were scored for overall maturity of moral judgment using the following scoring elements:
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Concern for the sanctity of the individual.
2.
Judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law.
Concern for the welfare of society as a whole.
4.
Capacity to see both sides of an issue.
Four raters scored each protocol; two points were assigned to an item if any of the four scoring elements was clearly present in the response, one point if any of the scoring elements could be readily inferred, 0 if they were missing. The interrater reliability was estimated to be .88, and the reliability of the test itself was .82. Each member of the fraternity also rated the others for "sensitivity to injustice," defined as "...one who is quick to perceive unfairness in the decisions of persons or groups, or in the treatment that persons or groups receive from others.
He may or may not openly express his concern; homever, his feelings will be obvious to those who know him. One who is insensitive to injustice will be less likely to notice the unfairness in a situation, and will rarely show concern when such unfair treatment is pointed out to him." The reliability of these ratings, after refinement by factor analysis, varied between .86 and .93. An tmportant preltminary question concerns the relationship between scores for maturity of moral judgment and rated sensitivity to injustice--the coefficients were .43,
.13, and .52 for the three fraternities respectively. If scores for maturity of moral judgment are taken as a partially valid index of moral maturity," then correlations between these scores and the five dimensions of character development provide some indication of how well the total model works. These data are presented in Table 3 , which contains no information about the relationship between mature moral judgment and moral knowledge. Kohlberg (1964) Kay, 1968, p. 218; Wright 1971, pp. 202-228) ; In The Psychology of Character Development, Peck and Havinghurst (1960) presented what is perhaps the most important of these; it might be useful to trace the parallels between their typology and the model of character development presented here. To define empirically the primary dimensions of character development, Peck and Havinghurst obtained in situ ratings of their adolescent subjects on 35 "moral" traits. These traits were intercorrelated and factor analyzed, and the three factors which emerged should by now be familiar.
The first described "...behavior which conforms positively to the 29 Peck and Havinghurst's second dimension was defined by: (1) the "degree to which subject accurately recognizes the usual behavior patterns of the people around him, can predict what they are likely to do, and how they are likely to react in a given action;" (2) the "capacity to understand other people's reasons for acting as they do;" (3) the "capacity for 'feeling with' other people; for experiencing, at least to some extent, the same emotions they are experiencing at the moment;" and (4) the "degree to which conscious or preconscious selfperception is congruent with the behavioral self" (cf. Peck and Havighurst, 1960, pp. 221, 223, 244) . This second dimension closely approximates Empathy.
The third dimension was more ambiguous. Finally, this paper has argued that the concepts of moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, autonomy, and the moral judgment continuum are critical for explaining moral conduct and defining moral character; however, these concepts do not exhaust the set of considerations relevant to moral development. For example, the paper says nothing about the manner in which the self-concept may guide moral conduct, nor is there any discussion of the role of conscience in these affairs.
These omissions were deliberate, based on the fact that conscience and the self-concept seem remarkably resistant to quantification, and that the relationship between these variables and overt moral conduct is extraordinarily complex, both conceptually and empirically. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that a complete psychological account of the lives of 32 such persons as Saint Francis of Assisi, Mahatma Gandhi, and the suffering souls so vividly portrayed in William James' Varieties of Religious Experience, will require additional concepts to supplement those outlined here. Thus, while it seems more faithful to reality to consider moral development in terms of a multidimensional model than in terms of single dimensions such as superego development, role-taking ability, or the heteronomy-autonomy continuum, there is still much work to be done before we arrive at an adequate understanding of moral maturity.
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